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ABSTRACT
Targeted killings are a major, albeit controversial, policy in the modern
war against terror. Yet, since modern warfare is conducted at large among
civilian populations, the lives of troop soldiers, who are called to fight not
behind battle lines but inside unknown hostile environments, are highly at stake.
The present paper would like to present the position that subject to the principle
of proportionality and irrespective of the legal regime governing targeted
killings, extensive troop losses should also constitute, along with concern for
enemy civilian casualties, a legitimate reason for the endorsement of the
practice of targeted killings.
I. INTRODUCTION
In April 2002 the Israeli Defence Forces entered Jenin, in the West Bank,
in the course of an operation to arrest Palestinian terrorists. A fierce battle
erupted. The soldiers had to pass along booby trapped buildings, while the
Palestinian fighters targeted them, hiding inside the civilian population.
* Intern in the Legal Department of the Knesset, the Israeli Parliament, LL.M, Faculty of Law,
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. The writer would like to thank Dr. Yuval Shany for his useful
comments. The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and in no way do they reflect
the positions of the Israeli legislative or executive bodies.
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According to the Report of the United Nations' Secretary General,' this battle
resulted in the death of about fifty-two Palestinians, half of them civilian
although it was argued that the number of the civilian casualties in the
particular incident was much lower.2 Moreover, twenty-three Israeli soldiers
also died, a heavy toll for the Israeli army.'
In December 2001, Yemeni Special Forces attempted to capture Al-Ahdal
and Al-Harethi, major operative members of Al Qaeda in the country. Tribal
forces in the village of Al-Hosun in Marib province, supporting Al-Ahdal,
opened fire against the Yemeni forces, killing eighteen Yemeni soldiers before
the terrorists managed to escape.4
In modern warfare, conducted at large among civilian populations, it is not
only the civilians' lives which are in constant danger, but also those of the troop
soldiers, who are called to fight not behind battle lines but inside unknown
hostile environments. Yet, these troop casualties would have been avoided had
the respective countries opted for operations by air against the specific targets.
Targeted killings are the most widely used, yet also highly disputed
expression of the aforementioned policy. The present article would like to
demonstrate that subject to the principle of proportionality and irrespective of
the legal regime governing targeted killings, the troops' right to life constitutes
a valid consideration for its endorsement. Targeted killings should be taken into
account in any military commander's planning of an operation.
As such, Part II will focus on the legality of targeted killings. Once
confirmed that the particular practice is not ab initio illegal, Part III will try to
demonstrate that both according to international humanitarian law and human
rights law, the lives of the soldiers should constitute a valid reason for resort to
the particular practice. Part IV will delve into international jurisprudence, in
an attempt to examine the limits of protection for the right to life. Part V will
examine the sensitive balance between the lives of soldiers and those of enemy
civilians, by focusing on the conditions under which the consideration of troop
losses could lead to the approval of a targeted killing and by proposing the
1. The Secretary General, Report of the Secretary General prepared pursuant to General
Assembly Resolution ES-10/1O, 43, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/ES-10/186 (July 30,
2002), available at http://www.un.org/peace/jenin/ (last visited Sept. 4, 2007).
2. See id. 57. According to the Israeli government the number of civilian casualties amounted
to fourteen deaths.
3. HCJ 3114/02 Barake v. Minister of Defense [2002] IsrSC 56(3) 11. The statement of the Israeli
Supreme Court, adjudicating on allegations of a massacre, that "in Jenin there was a battle-a battle in which
many of our soldiers fell. The Army fought house to house and, in order to prevent civilian casualties [to the
greatest extent possible], did not bomb from the air. Twenty- three IDF soldiers lost their lives. Scores of
soldiers were wounded." Id.
4. Gregory Johnsen, Terrorists in Rehab: Yemen Uses the Pages of the Qur'an To Re-educate
its Jihadis, 17 WORLD MAGAZINE ONLINE 3, Summer 2004, http://www.worldviewmagazine.com/issues/
article.cfm?id=139&issue=34 (last visited Sept. 4, 2007).
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principle of proportionality as a guiding standard. Finally, Part VI will try to
offer some conclusions.
II. THE PRACTICE OF TARGETED KILLINGS
While the modem way of warfare has changed, with an emphasis on the
war on terrorism, it is true that targeted killings are now one of the basic
features of this war.5 As such, it should cause no surprise that major countries,
like the United States and Israel, engaging in the fight against terrorism, have
resorted to the particular policy.
In November 2002, the United States killed A1-Harethi, an Al-Qaeda
member, in a targeted killing.6 Even before the September 11 th attacks, the
United States had considered the possibility of resorting to the particular
practice. Presidents Clinton and Bush had reportedly authorized not only the
arrest of Osama Bin Laden, but also his extermination, in case that was needed.7
In December 2002, the New York Times reported that the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) is authorized to kill individuals, described as terrorist leaders, on
a list approved by the White House.8 As for Israel, it has repeatedly resorted
to the particular practice against the Palestinian terrorist groups. 9
Notwithstanding its basic feature in the war against terrorism, it is true that
nowadays the concept of targeted killings is also one of the most misunderstood
concepts, often labeled by Non-Governmental Organizations ° as well as some
United Nations' bodies" as extra judicial killings and assassinations. Yet, the
5. It is not by accident that the two states which have resorted to this option, the United States and
Israel, both face serious terrorist threats.
6. CNN, Sources: U.S. Kills Cole Suspect, Nov. 5,2005, http://archives.cnn.com/2002iWORLD/
meast/1 1/04/yemen.blast/index.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2007).
7. Nathan Canestaro, American Law and Policy on Assassinations of Foreign Leaders: The
Practicability of Maintaining the Status Quo, 26 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 29-30 (2003).
8. James Risen and David Johnston, CIA Expands Authority to Kill Qaeda Leaders, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 15, 2002, at A2.
9. The policy of targeted killing, as far as Israel is concerned, started with the killing of Hussein
Abayat. See Yael Stein, Position Paper: Israel's Assassination Policy: Extra-Judicial Executions, (Maya
Johnston trans., 2001), available at htpp://www.btselem.org/Download/200101_Extrajudicial Killings_
Eng.doc (last visited Sept. 4, 2007).
10. See id.; Amnesty International, Israel andthe Occupied Territories: Israel Must End its Policy
of Assassinations, http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/MDE1 50562003ENGLISH/$File/MDE1 505603.pdf
(last visited Sept. 4, 2007).
11. See U.N. Comm'n on H.R., Question of the Violation of Human Rights in the OccupiedArab
Territories, including Palestine, Report of the Human Rights Inquiry Commission, IN 53-64, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/2001/121 (Mar. 16,2001), available at http'//documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/GOI/118/
72/pdf/G01 1 1872.pdfOpenElement (last visited Sept. 4, 2007); U.N. Comm'n on H.R., Report of the
Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the Situation ofHuman Rights in the Palestinian
Territories Occupied by Israel since 1967, 10, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/30 (Dec. 17, 2002), available at
http://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G2/160/00/PDF/G0216000.pdfOpenElement (last
visited Sept. 4, 2007).
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truth is that the differences between targeted killings and the other two concepts
are so great, that someone can easily distinguish between the three practices.
Extra judicial killings are basically punitive measures aimed against
regime dissenters or human rights defenders, who are killed for ideological
reasons without a fair trial during peacetime.12 Extra judicial killings violate
cardinal rights, such as the right to life and the right to a fair trial. 3 Even if the
hypothesis is made that their purpose is also defensive, still they are condemn-
able.
Although according to human rights conventions, such as Article 2 of the
European Convention on Human Rights, state agents have a right to forfeit a
person's life in the course of resort to the right of self defense, this possibility
is to be narrowly interpreted as an ultimum refugium once the arrest of a
particular suspect is not feasible, under the particular conditions enumerated in
the specific provisions of Article 2. Moreover, in cases where a deprivation of
life takes place by state agents, the state has a duty to investigate the matter. In
peacetime, there is no need or justification for individuals to be killed on
suspicion of membership in a group. 4 A person should be detained and entitled
to contest his/her detention in a meaningful way that involves due process of
law.'5 Under this specter, the fact that the Human Rights Committee has
repeatedly condemned the particular practice 6 should cause no surprise.
Targeted killings have often been labeled as "assassinations." Yet,
assassinations are understood to be the selected killing of an individual enemy
by treacherous means. 7 On the contrary, when a state is in an armed conflict, 8
targeted killings (given the turbulent background) are defensive measures-not
12. Antony Carillo-Suarez, Hors deLogique: Contemporary Issues in International Humanitarian
Law as Applied to InternalArmed Conflict, 15 AM. U. IN'L L. REv. 1, 133 (1999).
13. AmyHowlett, Getting "Smart:" Crafting Economic Sanctions thatRespectAllHuman Rights,
73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1199, 1225 (2004).
14. Mary O'Connell, War Crimes Research Symposium: The Role of Justice in Building Peace:
To Kill or Capture Suspects in the Global War on Terror, 35 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 325, 330 (2003).
15. Gabor Rona, War, International Law and Sovereignty: Re-evaluating the Rules of the Game
in a New Century: Legal Frameworks to Combat Terrorism: An Abundant Inventory of Existing Tools, 5
CHI. J. INT'L L. 499, 502 (2005).
16. See H.R. Committee, Concluding Observations ofthe Human Rights Committee: Georgia, Part
IV 15, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.75 (May 5, 1997); H.R. Committee, Concluding Observations of the
Human Rights Committee: Brazil, 31 U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.66 (July 24, 1996).
17. Benjamin Gorelick, The Israeli Response To Palestinian Breach of the Oslo Agreements, 9
NEW ENG. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 651, 669 (2003).
18. See Ralph Ruebner, Democracy, Judicial Review and the Rule ofLaw in the Age of Terrorism:
The Experience of Israel-A Comparative Perspective, 31 GA. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 493, 541 (2003);
Emmanuel Gross, Thwarting Terrorist Acts By Attacking The Perpetrators or their Commanders as an Act
of Self-Defense: Human Rights Versus the State's Duty To Protect its Citizens, 15 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J.
195, 224 (2001).
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treacherous means. 9 The laws of war recognize the non-culpable homicide of
members of an opposing force during armed conflict.2"
As such, targeted killings are seen as an integral part of warfare, to be
distinguished from assassination in peacetime, which is a form of terrorism.
This is a well entrenched principle of international law. Although the opinions
of Grotius, Vattel and Bynershoek condone an attack on an enemy leader with
the intent of killing him, provided it is not treacherous,2 their opinions are not
directly responsive to questions of targeting modern terrorists.22 Regardless,
they hold a special importance due to their demonstration that classical
international law always endorsed the possibility of killing leading enemies.
This being the case, it is appropriate to analyze targeted killings under the
broad category of international law relating to the conduct of war.23
Moreover, it is doubtful whether large scale operations to apprehend
terrorists, like those adopted by the United States and the United Kingdom in
Afghanistan or the Operation "Defensive Shield" of the Israeli army in 2002,
are morally preferable to targeted killings. The invasion of a civilian area and
the fighting that erupts lead to the death and injury of far more people, mostly
innocent, and bring misery and destruction to people who are minimally
involved in terror or military attacks.24
Under this spectrum, targeted killings can be justified under certain
conditions. 25 First, the state should be facing a security threat that it can not
incapacitate with other reasonable alternatives, like arresting the attacker.
Second, the principle of proportionality, dictating the minimum number, or
even the complete absence26 of civilian casualties, 27 should always be revered.
19. Nicholas Kendall, Israeli Counter Terrorism: TargetedKillings Under International Law, 80
N.C. L. REV. 1069, 1076-77 (2002).
20. See Kenneth Watkin, Canada/United States Military Interoperability and Humanitarian Law
Issues: Land Mines, Terrorism, Military Objectives and Targeted Killing, 12 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 281,
309-10 (2005); O'Connell, supra note 14, at 328.
21. Patricia Zengel, Assassination and the Law of Armed Conflict, 134 MiL. L. REv. 123, 130
(1991).
22. Daniel Pickard, Legalizing Assassination? Terrorism, the Central Intelligence Agency and
International Law, 30 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 17 (2001).
23. Kendall, supra note 18, at 1073-74.
24. Daniel Statman, Targeted Killing, 5 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 179, 187 (2004).
25. See David Ennis, Pre-emption, Assassination and the War on Terrorism, 27 CAMPBELL L. REV.
253, 255 (2005); David Kretzmer, Targeted Killings of Suspected Terrorists: Extra-Judicial Executions or
Legitimate Means of Defence?, 16 EUR. J. OF INT'L L. 171, 211 (2005).
26. Kretzmer, supra note 25, at 204.
27. See Amos Guiora, Symposium: "Terrorism on Trial": Targeted Killings as Active Self
Defence, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 319, 322 (2004); William Wagner, As Justice and Prudence Dictate:
The Morality ofAmerica's War Against Terrorism-A Response to James V. Schall, S.J, 51 CATH. U. L.
REV. 35, 50 (2001); Amos Guiora, Legislative and Policy Responses to Terrorism: A Global Perspective,
7 SAN DIEGO INT'L L. J. 125, 145 (2005) [hereinafter Guiora fl]; Emmanuel Gross, Democracy in the War
Against Terrorism-The Israeli Experience, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1161, 1194 (2002).
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Opposite enemy civilian casualties as a parameter for the approval of an
aerial strike, the right to life of one's troops, as an expression of the principle
of military necessity, is juxtaposed. Thus, when a military commander is
almost certain that the sending of troops in a populated area in order to arrest
a terrorist would result in losses among his troops, aerial strikes pose as a
legitimate alternative, even at the expense of some enemy civilian casualties.
Although international humanitarian law and human rights law interact
differently in international and non-international conflicts, changing the
standards governing the legality of targeted killings,28 consideration of the lives
of the soldiers remains a legitimate factor in any decision concerning an aerial
operation.
Irrespective of the international or non-international character ofa conflict
and the application of international humanitarian or human rights law, troop
losses are always relevant, because in both fields of law, humanity and respect
for human dignity as well as the principle of proportionality are basic
elements.29 The conclusion is particularly important in the new war against
terrorism, where states are engaged in sui generis conflicts having elements of
both international and non-international conflicts.3"
III. THE CONSIDERATION OF THE SOLDIERS' LIVES AS A LEGAL DUTY UNDER
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
A. The principle of military necessity
Under international humanitarian law, while members of the armed forces
and civilians enjoy the same fundamental right to life, that right is limited by
military necessity. A primary goal of military necessity is the submission of the
enemy at the earliest possible moment with the least possible expenditure of
personnel and resources.3 Moreover, it is international humanitarian law that
acknowledges the possibility of civilians being killed or wounded as a result of
a military operation against a lawful target. Collateral damages are a well
28. For a complete analysis of the circumstances under which targeted killings would be permissible
in international and non-international armed conflicts, see Kretzmer, supra note 25, at 171-212.
29. See Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 239, 245
(2000); Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1, Judgment, 183 (Dec. 10, 1998).
30. Kretzmer, supra note 25, at 175, 196. See also David Kretzmer, Agora: ICJAdvisory Opinion
on Construction of A Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory: The Advisory Opinion: The Light
Treatment of International Humanitarian Law, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 88, 96 (2005) (discussing the difficulty
of establishing whether the conflict between Israel and the various Palestinian terrorist groups is an
international or a non- international one and the different opinions expressed).
31. William Fenrick, The Rule ofProportionalityandProtocollin Conventional Warfare, 98 MIL.
L. REV. 91, 93 (1982).
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known accepted phenomenon in the international humanitarian law frame-
work.3
2
According to military necessity, a belligerent can, subject to the laws of
war, apply any amount and kind of force to compel the complete submission of
the enemy with the least possible expenditure of life. 33 Thus, a military
commander does not have to sacrifice members of his force in order to
exterminate the enemy, once he can achieve the same goal without any troop
losses. The fact that civilians could be also be killed or injured as a result of
the particular operation does not constitute an absolute factor forbidding the
conduct of the operation.
Once it is accepted that civilians can eventually die in the course of
hostilities, the important features that determine the legality of the operation
towards them are whether they were themselves directly targeted34 and whether
the number of civilian losses contravened the principle of proportionality.
Yet, although military necessity does broaden the protection awarded to
troops, it does not necessarily legally bind the army commander to preserve by
all means his soldiers' lives. Military necessity gives the discretion to the
military commander to beat the enemy while minimizing casualties in his
troops. Yet, military necessity does not legally guarantee the life of a soldier,
as his commander may decide for whatever reason to endanger the soldier's life
instead of opting for alternate measures.
As such, military necessity should be seen through the lens of another
basic principle of international humanitarian law-the principle of humanity.
B. The principle of humanity
The notion of humanity always constituted a pillar of the laws of war.35
International humanitarian law has been traditionally seen as a triumvirate
equation" under which military necessity is framed by the prohibition of
unnecessary suffering during the proportionate application of military force, 7
32. Id. at 94.
33. Chris Jochnick & Roger Normand, The Legitimation of Violence: A Critical History of the
Laws of War, 35 HARV. INT'L L.J. 49, 93 (1994).
34. Edda Kristjansdottir, The Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Under Current
International Law: The Arguments Behind the World Court's Advisory Opinion, 30 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 291, 352 (1997-1998).
35. See Corfu Channel (U.K. of Gr. Brit. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4,22 (Apr. 9); Legality of the Threat
or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 79 (July 8).
36. Gabor Rona, Interesting Times For International Humanitarian Law: Challenges from the
"War on Terror, " 27 FLETCHER FORUM OF WORLD AFFAIRS 55, 57 (2003).
37. Dale Stephens, Human Rights andArmed Conflict-The Advisory Opinion ofthe International
Court ofJustice in the Nuclear Weapons Case, 4 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1, 17 (2001).
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in an effort to "humanize" a reality-like that of war-which is dominated by
cruelty and barbarity.
The Geneva Conventions, especially the fourth one, with the explicit
provisions for the protection of non combatants and the insistence on the
distinction between combatants and non combatants in the first place are a clear
indication of the borders that international humanitarian law came to put on the
conduct of hostilities and of the humanitarian face of international humanitarian
law.
The same humanistic borders were also settled regarding combatants.
Since the essence of war is the forfeit of combatants' lives, the humanitarian
aspect did not find expression in the non allowance of their killings, but to the
concern the particular branch of law showed regarding the way their deaths
should occur. Thus, the use of certain types of weaponry, causing unnecessary
suffering and superfluous injury, was forbidden.
Yet, it is important to note that the extent of this concern varied
significantly. In the case of civilians, it encompassed their right to life, while
in the case of combatants, the forfeit of their lives was deemed up to a point
acceptable-the laws of war coming to reassure only its dignified and more
painless character. Moreover, the laws of war traditionally protected persons
on the side of the enemy, but not persons from their own governments or
authorities.
According to the jus in bello, both the aggressor and the aggressed are
bound by the same standards38 and in the law of armed conflict all lives have
equal value.39 These particular conclusions juxtaposed to the jus ad bellum
which governs the legality or not of a military operation, stress the fact that
even combatants belonging to the side resorting to the illegal use of force
should be equally protected as combatants of the defending state.
Yet, the equal protection of combatants injus in bello was not meant to
equate their status to the protection and the preference awarded to civilians by
international law. On the contrary, one basic premise of international
humanitarian law has always been the distinction between combatants and
civilians. It is exactly this distinction that was weakened by the applicability
of human rights norms in the law of conflict. 40
It is true that traditionally, human rights laws were not seen as mainly
applying in situations of armed conflicts-namely in cases where two or more
armed groups are engaged in hostilities.4' The derogation clauses existing in
38. Rona, supra note 36, at 67.
39. Judith Gardam, Proportionality and Force in International Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 391, 412
(1993).
40. Francisco Forrest Martin, Using International Human Rights Law for Establishing a Unified
Use of Force Rule in the Law ofArmed Conflict, 64 SASK. L. REv. 347, 371 (2001).
41. O'Connell, supra note 14, at 328.
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international human rights instruments do suggest that application of their
provisions was indeed contemplated in times of war. Yet, their exceptional and
emergency character point to the fact that their drafters saw the application of
the instruments, under such circumstances, as the exception and not as the
standard rule. While human rights were deemed to apply during peacetime,
international humanitarian law had an exclusive role during times of war.
Nowadays, the aforementioned statement seems to be revised and human rights
are indeed seen as applicable in cases of armed conflict,4 2 without meaning that
there is a pretension that armed conflicts do not constitute a case where the
enforcement of human rights must take into account the existence of a
belligerent situation.
According to the prevailing view43 endorsed by the International Court of
Justice in its Advisory Opinion on the Legality of Nuclear Weapons" human
rights laws do apply in armed conflicts, yet the specific circumstances should
also be taken into account. International humanitarian law is to be applied as
lex specialis each time human rights application is called for, as a branch of law
more suitable to the particular circumstances. Yet, this should not lead to the
conclusion that human rights are subordinate to international humanitarian law.
Rather, the two fields of law are in a continuous dialogue.
Thus, although international humanitarian law determines what an
"arbitrary" deprivation of life is in order for a violation of the right to life to be
declared, it is human rights law, which influences the proper application of
international humanitarian law in tilting the balance between military
considerations and humanitarian concerns in favour of the latter.45
The introduction of human rights law in the law of armed conflict should
not be deemed as a legal coup d'etat. It is none other than the first article of the
First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions that constitutes the most
recent restatement of the Martens Clause-a clause deeply entrenched in
international humanitarian aw4 6-which stipulates that in cases not covered by
the Protocol or other international agreements both civilians and combatants
remain under the protection of the principles of international law derived, inter
alia, from those of humanity and from dictates of public conscience. 47 Thus, it
42. Roy Schondorf, Extra-State Conflicts: Is There A Need ForA New Legal Regime?, 37 N.Y.U.
J. Int'l L. & Pol. 1, 60 (2004).
43. See Meron, supra note 29, at 239; Louise Doswald-Beck & Sylvain Vite, International
Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law, 293 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 94 (1993).
44. Nuclear Weapons, supra note 35, at 25.
45. Orna Ben Naftaly & Yuval Shany, Living in Denial: The Application of Human Rights in the
Occupied Territories, 37 Is. L. REV. 17, 57 (2003-2004).
46. Theodor Meron, The Martens Clause, Principles of Humanity and Dictates of Public
Conscience, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 78 (2000).
47. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
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is the Martens Clause and consequently international humanitarian law itself,
which allowed its penetration by human rights law.48
The application of human rights in the field of war had an effect in the
moral as well as in the legal field. Acts embedded in the essence of war, such
as the killing of an enemy combatant, ceased to be viewed from an international
humanitarian viewpoint and thus was condoned as lawful. Once stripped off
the mantle of legality, the act in question started to stand out as a starkly
unjustifiable and inexcusable killing of a human being.49
Gradually, it became understood that the only justified reason for killing
soldiers is that in a war, soldiers are not seen as individuals but as agents of
their states.5" Were they to be judged as individuals, most soldiers would be
morally exempt from being killed by the enemy. However,judged as agents of
a collective, soldiers lose their personal merits and are seen only as "the
enemy,"5' targeted just because they constitute impersonal units who con-
ceptualize an impersonal general threat posed to the whole group by the enemy.
Thus, human rights law came to shed light also on the status of comba-
tants; like civilians, soldiers began to be considered as human beings with the
same needs and feelings. From a moral point of view, the notion52 was
entrenched that soldiers should be seen as a separate distinguishable unit from
their state of citizenship, many times not even agreeing with their governmental
policies. As such, also they-and not only civilians-should be regarded as
human beings with a dignity and separate personality, not as simple units in the
disposal of an army commander.
The implications of the former conclusion affected an attitude towards the
combatants' lives, both in relation to enemy combatants as well as the political
and military administrations of the soldier's own country. Regarding the
former, it was realized that although in life threatening cases the killing of an
enemy soldier would not only be morally defensible but also utterly necessary,
there are also circumstances where this would not be the case.
The shooting of an enemy combatant who poses no immediate security
threat for the other side's bodily integrity or life at the moment of his repose
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol IU) art. 1(2), Dec. 7, 1978, 16 I.L.M
1442.
48. Francisco Forrest Martin, The Unified Use ofForce Rule Revisited: The Penetration ofthe Law
of Armed Conflict by International Human Rights Law, 65 SASK. L. REv. 405, 405 (2002).
49. YORAM DINSTEIN, AGRESSION AND SELF DEFENSE 140 (Cabridge University Press 3rd ed. 2001)
(1988).
50. Statman, supra note 24, at 189.
51. RICHARD NORMAN, ETHICS, KILLING AND WAR 188(1995).
52. William Bradford, Barbarians at the Gates: A Post September 11th Proposal to Rationalize
the Laws of War, 73 Miss. L.J. 639, 721 (2004). The notion dates back to the Enlightenment. The famous
maxim of Rouseau that soldiers who surrender or lay down their weapons "cease to be enemies or instruments
of the enemy and become ordinary human beings again" is characteristic.
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such as would be the case with a combat soldier being attacked off duty while
sleeping or just having leisure time in a military post, can be brought as an
example. In such incidents, the enemy is targeted not because at the moment
of his death he is contributing to the military machine, but just because of the
potential part he could play in hostilities in the future. Such is the case with the
targeting of a soldier in a non combat post, such as a driver or a cook. If
potentiality is seen as a legitimate ground for killing, then civilian killings
should also be sanctioned, because they can theoretically also take arms and
join hostilities. Yet, the targeting of civilians is prohibited.
As far as his own state is concerned, the soldier should never be viewed
as a proper sacrifice the moment his life could be saved and the same military
objective could-in accordance with the principle of proportionality-be
achieved by other means. The state may not resort to any means to attain its
ends, as it is subject to law and morality. Disrespect for human dignity cannot
serve as the basis for any state action.5 3
Soldiers, should not be seen as means, but as an end by themselves, as
human beings with human rights, first and foremost the right to life. It is true
that a soldier has a duty towards his country to protect it. Yet, this does not
mean that the soldier has a duty to forfeit his life. A soldier is bound to fight,
not to die. The moment death as the culmination of a military operation
becomes a certainty and not just a speculation, and the whole discussion around
the operation is not about whether there would be any casualty troops, but how
heavy these casualties would be, the operation ceases to be an alternative and
should not even be considered from the beginning.
In a war, the notion of risk and the potential of death are embedded in
every military operation. Yet, the moment that this potential ceases to be a
potential and is transformed to a certainty, the whole notion of "risk" is also
annulled. The debate whether a specific risk is permissible or impermissible
in order to sanction the conduct of the operation, has a value as long as the
notion of "risk" itself stands in the foreground. As soon as it is replaced by a
mortal certainty, the whole argument regarding levels of operational dangers is
disqualified. As such, the fact that modem military ethics dictates that the
death of soldiers and not only of civilians should weigh as a factor in a military
commander's decision-making54 should come as no surprise.
53. Velasquez Rodriguez Case, 1988 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C.) No. 4, at 27 (July 29, 1988).
54. See Guiora, supra note 27, at 332; Guiora I, supra note 27, at 145; Assa Kasher & Amos
Yadlin, Fighting Against Terror Morally, 6 BITACHON LEuMI 5 (2003) [hereinafter Kasher].
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IV. THE CONSIDERATION OF THE SOLDIERS' LIvES AS A LEGAL DUTY UNDER
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS AND JURISPRUDENCE
From a legal point of view, the application of human rights and the fact
that they are attributed to every person because of his human nature irrespective
of assumption or performance of any obligations55 places force protection not
only as an important national policy concern, but also as an express legal
obligation56 towards the military commanders and political leaders of a
particular state.57 The human rights system directly addresses the responsibility
of a government vis-A-vis populations over which it exercises power.5 The
protection of human rights necessarily comprises the concept of the restriction
of the exercise of state power.59
The right to life is one of the most basic rights, embodied in all the major
human rights instruments and deemed by some also as ajus cogens right6" and
the most important of all human rights.6 With deep roots in natural law and
stipulated in the most important legal documents like the Magna Carta and the
Bill of Rights, the right to life is embodied nowadays in all the human rights
documents.62 Moreover, the right to life is not derogated in situations of public
emergency, such as a war.63
The fact that Article 15, Section 2 of the European Convention on Human
Rights clearly allows for the derogation of the right to life in cases where deaths
result from lawful acts of war should be taken to sanction only the possibility
of death as deeply embedded in the notion of war itself and not to justify, in any
55. A. DELAFIELD SMITH, THE RIGHT TO LIFE 52 (1955).
56. Martin, supra note 48, at 393.
57. Smith v. United Kingdom, 384 Eur. Ct. H.R. 620, 624 (2000), where it is stated that
investigations into military personnel's homosexuality and their pursuant discharge from the Royal Navy on
those grounds, constituted degrading treatment and violated the right to private life. See also Vereinigung
Demokratischer Soldaten Osterrichs and Gubi v. Austria, 20 Eur. Ct. H.R. 56, 87 (1994), where it was held
that the decision of the defence minister to prohibit the distribution of ajournal to military personnel, violated
the freedom of expression and article ten of the European Convention on Human Rights.
58. Meron, supra note 29, at 256-57.
59. The Word "Laws" in Article 30 of the American Convention on Human Rights, Advisory
Opinion OC-6/86, 1986 Inter-Am Ct. H.R (ser. A) No. 6, at 5 (May 9); Godinez Cruz v. Honduras, 1989
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 5, at 31 (Jan. 20, 1989).
60. Mark Janis, The Nature ofJus cogens, 3 CONN. J. INT'L L. 359, 359 (1988).
61. See Yoram Dinstein, The Right to Life, Physical Integrity andLiberty, in THE INTERNATlONAL
BIL OF RIGHTS 114, 114 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981); State v. Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at 214,217
(S. Aft.).
62. M. Cheriff Bassiouni, Human Rights in the Context of Criminal Justice: Identifying
International Procedural Protections and Equivalent Protections in National Constitutions, 3 DUKE J.
COMP. & INTL L. 235, 254 (1993).
63. See e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 4, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171; The European Convention on Human Rights, art. 15, Dec. 10, 1948, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
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case, unnecessary troop losses. The fact that the article comes to excuse deaths
stemming only out of lawful acts of war is indicative. As such and in light of
the other human rights instruments awarding a responsibility to the state to
preserve its nationals' lives, it is doubtful whether a command to soldiers to go
into a mission of "no return" would constitute a "lawful act of war."
Even if the view is put forward that in battle the deprivation of the right
to life does not occur by the state itself, but by a third party-because it is an
enemy combatant that forfeits the soldier's life-still the state can be held
accountable. Not only are states obliged to not actively deprive their citizens
of the specific right arbitrarily, but are also held responsible for infringement
of human rights law once they do not prevent the entrance of their citizens in
life risking situations.
The duty to protect the right to life' entails, in the first place, a negative
obligation of respect. The duty of respect encompasses the obligation to pre-
vent situations that might imperil human life and eventually the obligation to
prosecute persons responsible for a loss of life.6"
Thus, in the Velasquez Rodriguez case, the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights clarified that a state can be found imputable of a human rights
violation not because the violation itself could be attributed to the state or one
of its agents, but because the state did not take the necessary steps in order to
prevent the particular violation from taking place.66 In Godinez Cruz v.
Honduras, it was held that an illegal act which violates human rights and which
is initially not directly imputable to a state can lead to international responsi-
bility of the state, not because of the act itself, but because of the lack of due
diligence to prevent the violation or respond to it as required.67
In Europe, the aforementioned statement was also incorporated in the
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. For example, in Osman
v. United Kingdom, the Court not only certified the aforementioned statement,
but also proceeded to establish a negligence standard according to which even
the reasonable ability to foresee a potential forfeit of life can constitute a valid
ground for claims of violations of the right to life. As the Court pronounced in
its judgment, sufficient grounds for such allegations required a demonstration
that the state knew or ought to have known of the existence of a real and
immediate risk to an individual from the criminal acts of a third party, and that
it had failed to take measures expected to avoid that risk.68 In another occasion,
64. JOHAN DE WAAL, lAIN CuRRIE, & GERHARD ERASMUS, THE BILL OF RIGHTS HANDBOOK 217
(3d ed. 2000).
65. Richard Desgagne, Integrating Environmental Values Into the European Convention on Human
Rights, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 263, 268 (1995).
66. Rodriguez, 1988 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. at 30-31.
67. Cruz, 1989 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., at 32.
68. Osman v. United Kingdom, 101 Eur. Ct. H.R. 245, 305 (1998).
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the same Court recognized that a potential violation may amount to an actual
violation when the injury is foreseeable and of serious and irreparable nature.69
Of course, it is true that a problem arises in determining when there is
enough "certainty" of the soldiers' deaths in order for the state to be obliged to
abstain from sending its soldiers in the battlefield. The answer lies in the
evidence available each time according to facts on the ground. In other words,
what are the objective chances that a soldier will survive from such a mission
without the requirement of a high level of proof.70
According to the aforementioned, sending soldiers into battles from where
they are bound with almost certainty not to return alive, is a clear violation of
these soldiers' right to life. Any argument that the forfeit of life is legal in war,
and thus a state could not be held accountable for a death that it has incurred
legally, is not feasible. First, killing a soldier is legal only from an enemy's
point of view. Second, even in situations where death is legally imposed by a
third party, a state is prohibited from allowing, much less creating, the circum-
stances leading to the forfeit of the lives of its citizens.
While indeed the state is brought into existence solely to protect its
nationals against harm, an idea dating back at least to ancient Greece,71 this
does not mean that the state only has a duty to protect its nationals from
external dangers, which makes the existence of an army necessary. The state
is equally obliged to protect its citizens from criminal behaviour internally,
even when the criminal behaviour stems from actions of the state itself. Thus,
as much as the state owes civilians a duty to do everything possible to protect
them from enemy attacks, it may not order its combatants to expose themselves
to excessive risks while protecting civilians.73
As such, although it is legitimate for the state to demand the drafting and
the active participation of its citizens in an army and their participation in
hostilities, even by endangering their lives to safeguard the state's territorial
entity, these state expectations cannot extend to the point that soldiers are sent
on expeditions which equal their certain extermination by the enemy.
The recognition that life can indeed be taken in a war, does not mean that
this can occur under all circumstances. In this regard, international
69. Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R., (ser. A) 439, 468 (1989).
70. John Pak, Canadian Extradition and the Death Penalty: Seeking a Constitutional Assurance
of Life, 26 CORNELL INTL L. J. 239, 274 (1993).
71. Michael Lacey, Self Defence or Self Denial: The Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction, 10 IND. INT'L & COMp. L. REv. 293, 310 (2000).
72. See Jeffrey Addicott, Proposal for a New Executive Order on Assassination, 37 U. RICH. L.
REV. 751, 761-62 (2003); Christopher Clarke Posteraro, Intervention in Iraq: Towards a Doctrine of
Anticipatory Counter-Terrorism, Counter-Proliferation Intervention, 15 FLA J. INT'L L. 151, 201 (2002).
73. Eyal Benvenisti, Human Dignity in Combat: The Duty to Spare Enemy Civilians, 39 ISR. L.
REV. 81, 89 (2006).
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jurisprudence regarding the imposition of the death penalty is indicative. The
latter came not only to define the circumstances under which the death penalty
should apply, but to erase the possibility of the imposition of the particular
sentence in the first place. Although death penalty still constitutes the legal
deprivation of life74 in cases where persons are convicted in countries which
have abolished the death penalty, their extradition or deportation to countries
where it is not only certain but even likely for them to face the particular
sentence, is forbidden.
The landmark case is that of Soering v. United Kingdom." Soering, a
West-German national, murdered his girlfriend's parents in the United States
and fled to the United Kingdom, from where his extradition was requested.
After the United States' request was answered positively by the British govern-
ment, Soering appealed to the European Court of Human Rights. The latter
refused to allow the extradition of Soering to the United States because of the
high probability that while there, the accused would be subjected to inhuman
or degrading treatment by being kept on death row for a prolonged period.76
Thus, the Court pronounced that the United Kingdom could not violate any
human rights of the accused, and was also prohibited from placing the accused
in a framework where violations of his rights were likely to occur.
The decision of the European Court in the case of Soering should not be
seen as an isolated example. Similar trends in international jurisprudence can
be traced in the decisions of the Human Rights Committee. In Kindler v.
Canada,77 as in Ng v. Canada,78 the Committee allowed Canada to extradite
Kindler to the United States without requiring the former to ask for guarantees
that Kindler was not going to be executed in the United States. Yet, in both
cases, the problematic nature of the Canadian practice was hinted. In Ng v.
Canada, the Committee held that Canada had violated Article 7 of the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, because Canada could have
easily foreseen that if Ng was to be extradited to the United States he could be
sentenced to death in California.79 While in the case of Kindler, although the
request for any guarantees for Kindler's life was not posed as a requirement for
the legality of the extradition, the Committee added that States must be mindful
of the possibilities for protection of life when exercising their discretion in the
74. Neira Alegria et al. Case v. Peru, 1995 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C.) No. 21, at 17 (Jan. 19,
1995).
75. Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 468.
76. Id. 91.
77. H.R. Comm., Communication No. 470/1991, Joseph Kindler v. Canada, U.N. Doe.
CCPR/C/48/D/470/1991 (Nov. 1, 1993) [hereinafter Kindler].
78. H.R. Comm., Communication No. 469/1991, Charles Ng v. Canada, No. 469/199, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/49/D/469/1991 (Jan. 7, 1994).
79. Id. 16.4.
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application of extradition treaties. 80 This was an important remark for the
extraditing country to note.
The preponderance of the assurances requirement gradually evolved in the
internal jurisprudence of the Canadian Supreme Court, in order to form a veto
requirement in the subsequent decisions of the Human Rights Committee. In
the case of United States v. Burns, the Canadian Supreme Court held that prior
to extradition, the Canadian government must seek assurances in all but
exceptional cases that the death penalty will not be applied.8 In Judge v.
Canada,82 the Human Rights Committee applied its requirement of assurances
also to a case of deportation where no legal framework existed in order to be
moulded according to requirements of respect for the right to life. Such was the
case with the extradition treaty between Canada and the United States, which
was required to be seen under this particular spectre. In Judge v. Canada, the
forbiddance of subjecting a person to a situation or ajurisdiction where his life
was likely to be endangered emerged as an independent rule and not as the
outcome of the interpretation of a legal framework.
In June 2001, the Constitutional Court of South Africa granted a petition
from Khalfan Khamis Mohamed, a participant in the Al Qaeda bombing of the
United States Embassy in Tanzania. After being arrested in South Africa,
Mohamed was summarily turned over to the Federal Bureau of Investigations
(FBI) in what the state called a "deportation," although the Court saw no reason
to view it as anything but a disguised extradition.83 The Court noted that in
handing Mohamed over to the United States without securing an assurance that
he would not be sentenced to death, the immigration authorities failed to give
any value to Mohamed's right to life, his right to have his human dignity
respected and protected, and his right not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman or
degrading punishment.84
In the case where soldiers are sent on a mission with almost certainty that
some or all of them will not return, the aforementioned jurisprudence is more
than relevant. First, even the likelihood of the forfeit of life can render a state
accountable for violation of its obligation to respect and insure the particular
right. Second, the state is not held accountable for the deprivation of soldiers'
lives by enemy combatants, but for their failure to take the necessary steps to
insure that these soldiers would not enter a situation that would certainly forfeit
80. Kindler, supra note 77, 14.6.
81. United States v. Bums, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283, 2001 SCC 7, 42.
82. H.R. Comm., Communication No. 829/1998, Judge v. Canada, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/78/
D/829/1998 (Aug. 5, 2003).
83. William Schabas, Symposium: Death Penalty and International Law: International Law.
Politics, Diplomacy and the Abolition of the Death Penalty, 13 WM. AND MARY BILL OF RTs J. 417, 441
(2004).
84. Mohamed v. President ofS. Afr. 2001 (3) SA 893 (CC) at 17 (S. Aft.).
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their lives. Thus, the state is held accountable for establishing the crucial link
that led to these soldiers' deaths. As such, it is irrelevant whether the soldiers
themselves wanted to join the mission or whether they were well paid or even
well trained for such missions.
Their consent to membership in the mission should be seen as consent to
the risk of death, but not to its certainty. Should that not be the case, in no way
could such consent be deemed lawful, as this would lead to a violation of the
state's international obligations regarding the preservation of the lives of the
people under its jurisdiction. As far as the professional training of soldiers is
concerned, it must be noted that the objective of training is to lessen the
chances of death and should not be seen as granting carte blanche to the state
to place soldiers in situations from which they are not about to exit.
Combatants are expected to assume reasonable risks, as far as their lives are
concerned,85 and constitute legitimate targets. Yet, as all human beings, they
are also entitled not to be arbitrarily deprived of their lives.86
The notion of arbitrariness as a legal potential for the legality of life
deprivation, appears explicitly in the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights as well as the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights.
Yet, as much as the specific term constitutes a basic parameter in the
consideration of the legality of life deprivation, it is also filled with vagueness.
This is not by accident. The drafters of Article 6 of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights left intentionally vague the definition of
"arbitrary", so as to insure wide latitude for the protection against deprivation.87
Indeed, the Human Rights Committee has interpreted the right to life broadly,
particularly in circumstances concerning the deprivation of life by a state's
security forces. 8
Yet, no matter how one reads and interprets the notion of arbitrariness in
relation to the right to life, the prohibition against the arbitrary deprivation of
life finds a ready application within the general principle of proportionality.89
According to the European Court of Human Rights, there must be regard for the
fair balance that has to be struck between the competing interests of the
individual and the community as a whole.9"
Thus, the competing interests of the army or of a state for the achievement
of a certain military result at all costs-even by troop losses-should be
balanced to the right of the individual to care for the perseverance of his life.
85. Benvenisti, supra note 73, at 90.
86. Id. at 83.
87. B. G. RAMCHARAN, The Concept and Dimension of the Right to Life, in THE RIGHT TO LIFE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 19 (B. G. Ramacharan ed., 1985).
88. Stephens, supra note 37, at 6-7.
89. Id. at 7.
90. Powell v. United Kingdom, 172 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 355, 368 (1990).
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Because the issue at stake is the waging of a balance and not the elimination of
one of the two interests, it is self-evident that a solution forfeiting soldiers' lives
cannot be condoned. On the other hand, a military solution that would achieve
the same military result in another way should be deemed utterly preferable.
As such, the principle of proportionality, a maj or principle in international
humanitarian law, should be invoked twice. The principle should be invoked
not only for the protection of civilians and the diminishment of their casualties,
but also for the protection of combat soldiers' lives, whose protection-albeit
grounded in the principle of military necessity-should be tempered by the
principle of proportionality.9 In fact, it is this particular principle which keeps
the balance between these seemingly opposite interests. Saving the lives of a
few soldiers cannot justify the endorsement of the death of a disproportionate
number of civilians. Concurrently, pity for one or two civilians cannot justify
the death of many more soldiers.
V. THE RIGHT To LIFE OF SOLDIERS V. THE RIGHT To LIFE OF CIVILIANS
It is accepted that soldiers are supposed to take some risks in order to save
the lives of enemy civilians.92 Yet, the question of the extent of these risks must
be framed by the principle of proportionality.93
The effects of any military operation and the hardship it inflicts on the
civilian population must be proportionate to the advantage that is achieved by
resorting to the particular practice,94 namely, the sparing of the lives of the
soldiers. The need for a balance between the right to life of civilians and the
right to life of soldiers is particularly urgent in our era. In the new war against
terrorism the battlefield is carried into civilian population centers. Terrorists
are hiding among civilians with the purpose of using these civilians as a means
91. The Judge Advocate General's School, TJA GSA Practice Note: International and Operational
Law Note, ARMY LAW., Feb. 1999 at 1, 6.
92. MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH HISTORICAL
ILLUSTRATIONS 151 (2d 1992).
93. The principle of proportionality finds expression in article 51 of the First Additional Protocol,
regarding international conflicts. Although in non-international conflicts, international humanitarian law does
not seem to wholly apply, yet article 13 of the Second Additional Protocol refers to the distinction between
combatants and civilians. As such, the standards ofintemational conflicts would be applicable; the targeting
of combatants would be legitimate, while the death of civilians would be subject to the principle of
proportionality. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment (Appeals Chamber) at 33-34 (Jul.
15, 1999) (the Tadic Case where the Appeals Chamber of the ICTYU stated that, "with the exception of
common article 3 ... the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 only apply to armed conflicts between state
parties"); International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC], Commentary on Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts (June 8, 1977) Art. 51 T 4.
94. Major John Parkerson Jr., United States Compliance With Humanitarian Law Respecting
Civilians During Operation Just Cause, 133 MIL. L. REV. 31, 47 (1991).
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of achieving immunity from attacks by the defending state95 and making their
elimination, without heavy civilian casualties, more difficult.
In modem warfare, where combatants purposely hide among the civilian
population-oftentimes with the encouragement of the civilians themselves-
the argument can even be posed that the latter constitutes a legitimate target.
What is included in the category of "targets," according to the Hague Regula-
tions and the laws of war, is broader than just troops in the field. Non-comba-
tants and civilians can be designated as a valid target if they are sufficiently
involved in the war effort. The decision of whether a civilian should be deemed
a valid target depends on context.96
In situations where aerial bombardments occur in areas that basically
constitute a battlefield where it is known that military targets are mainly
situated and civilian presence, if traced, should be deemed as unexpected or
incidental97according to Article 57 of the First Additional Protocol, any civilian
losses should not be deemed as contravening international humanitarian law.
Such would be the case for any civilians remaining in an area after having been
warned by the attacking army that the specific region would be subject to an
aerial bombardment.98
The critical issue that determines the legality of air strikes against military
targets is not the existence of civilian casualties, but their number. The
preference for sparing soldiers' lives and the price it inflicts on the enemy
civilian population is legitimate, once no other operational alternatives exist,
sound and reliable information are at the army's disposal regarding the
particular target99 and the incidental loss of life in the enemy civilian population
is not excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage.
The problem with the principle of proportionality is that as every principle,
it is quite abstract and thus difficult to apply. 0 In weighing the pros and cons
and possible disagreements regarding the legality ofan operation in cases where
joint military action has to be taken, a military commander may find it difficult
95. See Guiora, supra note 27, at 329; Emmanuel Gross, Use of Civilians as Human Shields: What
Legal and Moral Restrictions Pertain to a War Waged by a Democratic State Against Terrorism?, 16
EMORY INT'L L. REv. 445,456 (2002); Statman, supra note 24, at 186.
96. Castenaro, supra note 7, at 8.
97. Asa Kasher, the man who wrote the military ethics code of the Israeli Defense Forces says that,
"assuming that we warned the civilians and gave them enough time to leave and that the civilians that
remained chose, themselves, not to leave, then there is no reason to jeopardize the lives of the troops."
Nathaniel Rosen, IDF May Be Morally Justified In Flattening Terror Strongholds, JERUSALEM POST, Jul.
27, 2006 at 1-2.
98. Id
99. Guiora, supra note 27, at 322.
100. See Gardam, supra note 39, at 391; Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee
Establishedto Review the NA TO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic ofYugloslavia 48 (June
8, 2000), available at htpp://www.un.org/icty/pressrea/nato06l300.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2006).
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to concretize the principle, which can lead even to the annulment of an
operation. ' One additional difficulty is the fact that the number of potential
civilian casualties is never known in advance. In targeted killings this is
exceedingly true.
One additional issue that is raised in the practice of targeted killings in
respect to civilian casualties and is closely linked to the principle of propor-
tionality is whether the final large number of collateral civilian damages should
be seen as an ex ante or ex post facto for the pronouncement of the illegality of
the operation. In other words, the question is whether the legality of an attack
should be judged by the knowledge of its planners and their intentions to act
according to the laws of war or according to the results of the operation, such
as the high number of civilian casualties or the revelation that the person
targeted was in fact innocent.
Jurists have always been loath to "second guess" the military which
operates often in the heated context of the battlefield.'0° Yet, expectations are
higher in cases where the planners of a particular operation have the time and
possibility to calmly take into consideration various parameters before making
a decision-in our case, the order for a targeted killing. The deep split among
thejudges of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights in the
McCann case is indicative. '03
In the particular case, the Court had to adjudicate on the legality of the
killing of three members of the Irish Republican Army by the British Special
Air Forces in Gibraltar. The British had reason to believe that the particular
persons were planning a terrorist attack. Thus, when British soldiers perceived
a move by one of the terrorists as an attempted detonation of a bomb, fire was
opened by the British forces. This eventually led to the killing of all the
terrorists. The majority of the Court, albeit slim and based on the double vote
of the Court's president, stressed the erroneous assumptions that eventually led
to the opening of fire and the death of the terrorists. 1"4 As such, the Court
emphasized the facts and the objective reality rather than the subjective reality
of the planners of the operation and the soldiers who, when they opened fire,
did not know and could not have known in advance that the particular persons
were not carrying a bomb. With all the information they had, the opposite
hypothesis was more plausible. As such, the majority opted to take a objective
view of the operation, rather than a post event point of view.
101. Francoise Harnpson, States' Military Operations Authorized by the United Nations and
International Humanitarian Law, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 371,
400 (Luigi Condorelli, Anne-Marie La Rosa & Sylvie Scherrer eds. 1996).
102. Martin, supra note 40, at 381.
103. McCann v. United Kingdom, 324 Eur. Ct. H.R., (ser. A.) 97, 97 (1995).
104. Id. at 175-76.
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On the contrary, the minority underlined the importance of judging the
legality of the operation according to the data that the planners of the attack had
in their disposal.'l 5 This tendency is reinforced by positions of states like the
United Kingdom, which ratified the Additional Protocol and rushed to specify
its interpretation of the text, stating that the commander in charge had the
authority to make a decision with the knowledge he had at the time of the
attack. According to this position, we should not benefit from the hindsight of
the judge in applying the inherent standard of excessiveness. Rather, the
ultimate determination is made on a moral basis.'0 6
Since nowadays most battles are being conducted among civilian
populations, graver civilian and troop casualties should be expected to occur in
cases of ground operations. Thus, the option of operations by air is the best
moral and legal alternative. This option protects not only the attacking state's
troops, but also their enemy civilian population.
The case of Israel and the targeted killings it performed in Gaza Strip---the
most densely populated area in the world-is characteristic. In June 2006,
targeted killings by the Israeli Air Force resulted in thirteen civilian casualties,
which spanned over the course of a week.0 7 Once the Israeli Army decided to
enter the Gaza Strip, the number of casualties in one day rose to twenty-three,
and Israeli soldiers were also killed. Although a big part of the aforementioned
Palestinian casualties were combatants, irrespective of their precise number'
it is more than logical that the casualties and suffering among civilian
populations were augmented due to the ground operation. 109
105. Id. at 179-87, (Bernhardt, Vilhjamsson, Golcuklu, Pekkanen, Freeland, Baka & Jambrek,
dissenting).
106. Vincent Proulx, If the Hat Fits, Wear It, If the Turban Fits, Run for Your Life: Reflections on
the Indefinite Detention and Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists, 56 HASTINGS L. J. 801, 885 (2005).
107. Irwin Arief, U.N. Again Urges Israel To Cease Targeted Killings, REUTERS, June 21, 2006,
available at http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/KKEE-6QYPW7?OpenDocument&rc
=3&emid=ACOS-635PFR (last visited on Sept. 14, 2007).
108. Avi Yischaharof, How Many Were Killed in the Operations of the Israeli Army? It Depends
on Whom we are Asking in the Gaza Strip (in Hebrew), HAARETZ, June 07, 2006, available at
http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasite/pages/ShArtPE.jhtml?itemNo=736176&contrasslD=2&subContrasslD=21
&sbSubContrasslD=0 (last visited Oct. 19, 2007).
109. See IDF: Basel Was Killed By Friendly Fire, JERUSALEM POST, Jul. 9, 2006, available at
http://www.jpost.com/servletSatellite?cid=l 150885950567&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull
(last visited on Sept. 14, 2007); CNN, Report: Hamas Orders Palestinian Forces To Fight Israel: Up to 23
Palestinians, I Israeli killed as Gaza Offensive Intensifies, Jul. 6, 2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/
WORLD/meastI07/06/israel.soldier/index.html (last visited on Sept. 14,2007). See also Amos Harel & Avi
Yischaharof, What is the Purpose? (in Hebrew), HAARETZ, June 30, 2006, available at http://www.
haaretz.co.il/hasite/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=733 143&contrasslD=0&subContrasslD
=0&sbSubContrasslD=O (last visited Sept. 14, 2007) (the article in Haaretz speaking of twelve civilian
casualties already only two days after the Israeli operation in Gaza).
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Force must be expected to produce a preponderance of good over evil.
Subject to the principle of proportionality, air strikes in general and targeted
killings in particular, should be endorsed in situations where the elimination of
an individual or a small group would preclude the forfeit of more lives or a
greater damage caused to the enemy population." 0 In such cases, the resort to
targeted killings poses not only as a legal possibility, but also as an ethical
demand. "1
VI. CONCLUSION
International humanitarian law always considered the death of combatants
as a fait accompli. Yet, a closer look to the particular branch of international
law as well as to human rights law leads to the conclusion that this should not
be the case. Soldiers also have a right to life, and the state has an obligation to
respect it and not send them on missions from where their return is unlikely.
Subject to the principle of proportionality, the extent to which consideration of
the lives of the troops should be taken into account is balanced with the enemy
civilian population's right to life. Cases where an operation would result in
heavy civilian casualties should be cancelled, even if the operation would have
likely minimized or eliminated the possibility of troop losses.
The aforementioned conclusions are well applied in modem warfare,
largely held in civilian populations, especially in regard to the dilemma of
modem armies in general whether to resort to air strikes instead of ground
operations-and to the policy of targeted killings in particular. Although it is
true that civilians' lives should continue to be held in reverence, the soldiers'
lives should also constitute a parameter which would render these strikes
lawful. The principle of proportionality should govern the extent to which the
strike is considered lawful.
Albeit difficult to be concretized and subject to the subjective decisions
of military commanders, the aforementioned principle is, bottom line, the
ultimate test for humanity's conscience-the chance for modem man to prove
that despite his engagement in battle, he has not lost his humanity. Like the
Abrahamic discussion with his Creator before the destruction of Sodom and
Gomorra, officials in top political and military echelons are called to ponder
and ultimately decide by themselves how many innocent lives are worth
sacrificing to save their troops.
110. Joshua Raines, Osama, Augustine and Assassination: The Just War Doctrine and Targeted
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111. See Guiora, supra note 27, at 328; Kasher, supra note 54, at 6.
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